On July 6, 2026, the Arizona Supreme Court held that multiple individuals who jointly purchase multiple insurance policies from the same insurer constitute “one insured” for the purposes of the anti-stacking provisions of A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H). Thus, an insurance company may prohibit a claimant from stacking multiple policies jointly purchased by multiple individuals from the same insurer.

Arizona’s Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Act (“UM / UIM”) allows an individual covered by more than one automobile insurance policy to collect benefits from multiple policies, i.e. “stack” the UM / UIM benefits unless the insurer strictly complies with the terms of A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H).[1] In 2023, the Arizona Supreme Court held that insurers seeking to prevent the stacking of UIM coverages under a single multi-vehicle insurance policy can only do so by following the terms of A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H). Franklin v. CSAA General Insurance Co.,255 Ariz. 409 (2023).  More recently, however, a claimant attempted to stack UIM benefits across multiple insurance policies issued to multiple insured individuals who jointly purchased the policies. State Farm Mutual Automobile v. Balzan, CV-24-0140-PR (Ariz. July 6, 2026).

The plaintiff, Connor Balzan, argued that multiple insured individuals do not constitute “one insured” under the statute, A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H), in his attempt to stack the benefits of multiple policies. Arizona’s Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that joint purchasers of multiple policies from the same insurer constitute “one insured” under the statute.

Mr. Balzan was injured in an automobile accident on April 5, 2019, and sustained injuries leading to medical expenses that exceeded the responsible party’s insurance coverage. Mr. Balzan thereafter sought UIM benefits from his insurer, State Farm. Mr. Balzan argued that he was entitled to the UIM benefits of his own policy as well as the stacked benefits of four policies purchased by his parents because he was part of their household at the time of the underlying collision.

State Farm paid Mr. Balzan the UIM benefits of his own policy and one of his parents’ policies, in line with A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H). Despite this, Mr. Balzan argued that he was entitled to the benefits of the three additional policies because each individual who contributed to paying the policy premium constituted a separate purchaser and, therefore, a separate insured. Interestingly, the trial court, Arizona Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court all rejected this position, albeit for somewhat different reasons. Balzan, ¶¶ 5–7.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected Mr. Balzan’s argument because it would undermine the statute’s language and “leave insurers unable to determine the scope of subsection (H) from the policy itself.” Balzan, ¶ 19. Instead, the Supreme Court held that all named insureds on a policy constitute “one insured” for the purposes of the anti-stacking provisions of § 20-259.01(H). Thus, insurers can continue to limit stacking according to the terms of that subsection, even in cases of multiple individuals who jointly purchase a policy, such as a married couple.

Read the entire opinion here.

[1] The full text of subsection (H) reads: “Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages are separate and distinct and apply to different accident situations. Underinsured motorist coverage shall not provide coverage for a claim against an uninsured motorist in addition to any applicable uninsured motorist coverage. If multiple policies or coverages purchased by one insured on different vehicles apply to an accident or claim, the insurer may limit the coverage so that only one policy or coverage, selected by the insured, shall be applicable to any one accident. If the policy does not contain a statement that informs the insured of the insured’s right to select one policy or coverage as required by this subsection, within thirty days after the insurer receives notice of an accident, the insurer shall notify the insured in writing of the insured’s right to select one policy or coverage. For the purposes of this subsection, “insurer” includes every insurer within a group of insurers under a common management.”

About Christian, Dichter & Sluga

Christian, Dichter & Sluga is a nationally recognized insurance and litigation law firm providing sophisticated legal solutions throughout Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico. For nearly 50 years, our attorneys have represented insurers, businesses, and organizations in complex coverage disputes, bad faith matters, litigation, and aviation-related claims. What sets CDS apart is the combination of deep courtroom experience, peer-recognized legal talent, and a collaborative approach that delivers the resources of a larger firm with the responsiveness and personal attention clients value. We don’t just know the law – we know the communities, courts, and industries we serve, allowing us to provide strategic counsel and outstanding results when our clients need it most.

The purpose of this publication is to provide readers with information on current topics of general interest and nothing herein shall be construed to create, offer, or memorialize the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The content should not be considered legal advice or opinion, because it may not apply to the specific facts of a particular matter. As guidance in areas is constantly changing and evolving, you should consider checking for updated guidance, or consult with legal counsel, before making any decisions.

This admission marks another significant milestone in Madison’s legal career and further expands her ability to advocate for clients in both state and federal court. It also reflects the dedication, professionalism, and passion for advocacy that have defined her career from the very beginning.

Madison’s commitment to the legal profession began during high school through mock trial competitions, where she discovered her passion for courtroom advocacy and criminal defense. She continued to develop those skills at Michigan State University, earning a degree in Political Theory and Constitutional Democracy through the James Madison Honors College while distinguishing herself as an accomplished mock trial and moot court competitor. During her undergraduate career, she founded the MSU Undergraduate Moot Court Association and earned numerous individual advocacy awards.

She later attended the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, where she built an impressive record of success in trial advocacy and oral argument competitions. While participating in Arizona’s Rule 39 program, Madison gained valuable courtroom experience by assisting with DUI trials, conducting evidentiary hearings, and representing real clients under the supervision of licensed attorneys. Her dedication to advocacy earned her numerous honors, including the Janet S. Muller Oral Advocacy Award, Order of the Barristers, Best Overall Advocate at the National Trial Advocacy Competition, and multiple first-place finishes in prestigious advocacy competitions.

Today, Madison brings that same passion, preparation, and commitment to every client she represents at Christian, Dichter & Sluga. In addition to serving clients, she continues to give back to the legal community by coaching Sun Devil Mock Trial, mentoring the next generation of trial advocates.

Madison’s admission to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona is a testament to her continued professional growth and unwavering commitment to excellence in the practice of law. We are proud to celebrate this achievement and look forward to her continued success as she serves our clients and our community.

Please join us in congratulating Madison on this well-deserved accomplishment.

In recognition of their leadership, legal talent, and hours of dedicated service to the firm, CDS has conferred shares in the firm to Jeffrey Hutchins, Jeanmarie (J.P.) Harrington Bisceglia, and Amanda Taylor. We’re thrilled to announce them as our newest shareholders and are confident that the future of the firm is in amazing hands.

We are proud to share that our firm again has been recognized by Chambers and Partners–a leading legal industry rankings organization–in its 2024 Chambers USA practice rankings. Christian, Dichter & Sluga has been recognized as a Band One–Insurance firm in Arizona; only five Arizona law firms have been ranked as Band One firms in this practice area. In addition, CDS partners Gena L. Sluga and Amanda Taylor (pictured) were individually recognized for their work in Insurance, which is the firm’s core practice area. Chambers rankings are based upon several qualities, including technical legal ability, professional conduct, client service, commercial vision, business understanding, diligence, commitment, and other qualities most valued by the clients.

This achievement would not have been possible without the trust and support of our firm’s incredible insurance clients. Christian, Dichter & Sluga, Ms. Sluga and Ms. Taylor are honored by this recognition and the kind words shared by clients during the research process.

Congratulations to Doug Christian, Gena Sluga, JP Harrington Bisceglia and Amanda Taylor for recognition in Insurance Coverage; Stephen Dichter in White Collar Criminal Defense; Jeff Hutchins for recognition in Business Litigation and Justin Vanderveer for recognition as a Rising Star in Insurance Coverage.

The Arizona Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Medina v. Est. of Cody, No. 1 CA-CV 22-0709, 2023 WL 6470727, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2023), in which Gena L. Sluga, managing partner at Christian Dichter and Sluga appeared on behalf of Sentry Insurance Company (“Sentry”). The Court held as follows:

·      The broad authority granted to the Navajo tribe to govern enrolled tribal members under the Treaty of 1869 precluded the underlying state court from hearing this particular action;

·      Federal precedent makes clear that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim against enrolled tribal members in state court for torts arising from conduct that occurs on a defendant’s reservation, even if the action occurs on a state highway.

SUMMARY

The Court of Appeals upheld the Superior Court’s dismissal of a tort claim based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The action arose from a two-car automobile accident that occurred on a state-maintained highway but on tribal land. Plaintiff argued that tribal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over civil tort actions arising from conduct that occurs on state-maintained rights-of-way. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal based on the Treaty of 1869 and decades of legal precedent.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter arose from an automobile accident along a section of U.S. Highway 89 in the Navajo Nation. The occupants of both vehicles were killed upon impact. Mr. Cody, the at-fault driver, was intoxicated and crossed the center line, colliding with the other vehicle, occupied by the Pena Delgado family. Medina, the personal representative for the Pena Delgado family, filed suit against Cody and a separate suit against Cody’s passenger, Aaron Chee, who permitted 18-year-old Cody to drive while intoxicated. The two lawsuits, filed in state court, were eventually consolidated into one action. Sentry successfully moved to intervene in the consolidated action and then moved to dismiss the case arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the tort arose out of on-reservation conduct by members of the Navajo Nation.

The Superior Court agreed and dismissed the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The following facts were undisputed in the dismissal:

(1) The Defendants were Navajo tribal members residing on the Navajo Reservation;

(2) The Pena Delgado family were not tribal members;

(3) The location of the accident was on a state highway within the territory of the Navajo reservation.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal, to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

LEGAL REASONING

The primary question before the court was one of jurisdiction over Native Americans and their land. The Court began by noting that questions of jurisdiction over Native Americans are a patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law compiled throughout history. The exact issue in this case was previously addressed in Enriquez v. Superior Court, 115 Ariz. 342, 342-43 (App. 1977). To resolve the question, the Enriquez court looked at the United States Supreme Court’s decision of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959) which held that state courts may not exercise jurisdiction over on-reservation activity and a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) which defined “Indian Country” to include all lands within the limits of any Indian Reservation, including rights-of-way running through the reservation.

Plaintiff acknowledged that the Enriquez decision has not been overruled in Arizona, but argued instead that subsequent case law raised questions of its continuing viability. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that a series of United States Supreme Court cases should be used to apply stricter limitations on the reach of tribal jurisdiction and urged the Court of Appeals to revisit and reverse Enriquez.

The Court of Appeals found that the Supreme Court, without overruling its prior holding of Williams, has identified a separate framework for resolving conflicts between state and tribal jurisdiction. Williams had created an infringement test considering the scope of state court jurisdiction over an enrolled tribal member. The more recent cases cited by Plaintiffs have explored the extent of tribal court jurisdiction over non-tribal members. The Court determined that Arizona has not assumed general jurisdiction over Native American tribes and their members, thus, its authority to address disputes involving tribal members for on-reservation conduct is limited by jurisdictional framework from the Supreme Court.

In this case, the Court of Appeals held that the pertinent facts fall squarely in the framework of the Williams’ decision. Under Williams, a state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if (1) a non-tribal member brings a claim against an enrolled tribal member for conduct occurring on that member’s reservation, or (2) all parties are enrolled tribal members of the same tribe and the claim involves conduct occurring on the tribes reservation. Under this test, the claims brought by Plaintiff falls under part (1) of the test and thus a state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

However, Plaintiff also argued that a U.S. Highway that runs through tribal land is non-Indian fee land. The Supreme Court has indeed previously concluded that state-maintained highway on which an accident occurred was the equivalent of non-Indian fee land. But, the decision of Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 449 (1997) was intentionally limited to actions against non-tribal members. As such, Strate does not supplant Williams. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Superior Court to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, as the Navajo tribal court’s authority would have been infringed had the state court decided the case on the merits.

Link to the opinion: https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/OpinionFiles/Div1/2023/1%20CA-CV%2022-0709%20-%20Medina%20v.%20Chee%20-%20Opinion.pdf

By: Asha Sebastian, Esq.

On July 28, 2023, the Arizona Supreme Court issued its Opinion in Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., CV-22-0266-CQ, 2023 WL 4833792, holding as follows:

1.    In order to prevent insureds from intra-policy stacking, insurers must comply with the anti-stacking provision of A.R.S. §20-259.01(H) by (a) expressly and plainly limiting stacking in the policy and (b) satisfying the notice requirement by informing the insured of their “right to select one policy or coverage” either in the policy itself or in writing to the insured within thirty days after the insurer is notified of the accident.

2.    A.R.S. §20-259.01(B) does not limit collection under UIM coverage.

SUMMARY

In Franklin, the Arizona Supreme Court answered two certified questions of law, submitted by the District Court of Arizona on the issue of stacking automobile insurance policies. The Court held that A.R.S. §20-259.01 mandates that a single policy insuring multiple vehicles provides separate underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage for each vehicle, and that intra-policy stacking is permitted. The Court also ruled that an insured may stack UIM coverages to recover an amount higher than her policy’s liability limits, regardless of the language in A.R.S. §20-259.01(B) governing what UIM limits insurers are required to offer.

FACTS

The Insured died in an automobile accident caused by a negligent driver. The Insured’s daughter, Ms. Franklin, collected the per-person liability of the negligent driver’s insurance policy and then submitted a UIM claim to her mother’s insurer, CSAA General Insurance Company.  At the time of the accident, the Insured’s Policy covered her two vehicles and provided $50,000 of UIM coverage “per person.” The policy also included a limitation of liability clause, limiting the amount paid to the Limit of Liability shown on the Dec Page, regardless of covered cars and premiums paid. 

In spite of receiving $50,000 under the Insured’s UIM coverage, Franklin sought to obtain an additional $50,000 under an “intra-policy stacking” theory, arguing that because the policy covered two vehicles, it provided a second separate UIM coverage which increased the Insured’s total UIM coverage from $50,000 to $100,000.  Franklin argued that because CSAA failed to comply with the notice requirements of A.R.S. §20-259.01(H), the policy’s UIM limits could be stacked.

When CSAA rejected Franklin’s claim for the additional $50,000, she sued CSAA in federal district court for declaratory judgment, alleging breach of contract and bad faith.  In the course of the litigation, CSAA filed a motion for the district court to certify two questions of law to the Arizona Supreme Court. The AZ Supreme Court accepted review to clarify how A.R.S. §20-259.01 regulates an insurer’s ability to preclude insureds from intra-policy stacking UIM coverages.

LEGAL REASONING

On the first question of whether A.R.S. §20-259.01 classifies multi-vehicle insurance policies as providing a single UIM coverage or multiple UIM coverages for each vehicle, the Court found that while the text of the statute was ambiguous, the statute’s history and purpose clearly indicated that multi-vehicle policies provide separate UIM coverages for each vehicle.  In coming to this conclusion, the Court reasoned as follows:

·      Subsection (H) of Arizona’s anti-stacking statute dictates how insurers can prevent insureds from stacking UIM or UM coverages. To limit stacking under subsection (H), insurers must (1) expressly and plainly limit stacking in the policy and (2) satisfy the notice requirement informing the insured of their “right to select one policy or coverage” either in the policy itself or in writing to the insured within thirty days after the insurer is notified of the accident.

·      The text of subsection (H) that relates to “coverages purchased” is ambiguous, as it is unclear whether a multi-vehicle policy constitutes purchasing of multiple UIM coverages for each vehicle. In reviewing the statutory history, the Court ruled that A.R.S. §20-259.01’s text and statutory history supports a broader interpretation of “coverages purchased.”  As a result, all multi-vehicle policies provide separate UIM coverage per vehicle that insured has “purchased,” triggering the application of subsection (H) to multi-vehicle policies.

·      The purpose of subsection (H), as amended in 1997, was to provide the sole means by which insurers may limit UIM/UM stacking – whether intra-policy (in a multi-vehicle policy) or inter-policy (when separate policies insure separate vehicles).

On the second question of whether A.R.S. §20-259.01(B) imposes a ceiling on UIM coverage based on the bodily injury or death liability limits of the policy, the Court held that subsection (B) does not restrict what an insurer may be obligated to pay out pursuant to a claim.  In coming to this conclusion, the Court reasoned as follows:

·      Subsection (B) requires insurers to initially offer insureds UIM coverage with “limits not less than the liability limits for bodily injury or death.” The legislature’s use of the phrase “not less than” means the insurer must, at a minimum, offer UIM coverage that is at least the same amount of the policy’s bodily injury or death liability limits.

·      Subsection (B) also allows insureds to request and purchase UIM coverage in any amount that the insureds select. Thus, an insured may reject the insurer’s initial offer and request UIM coverage in any amount up to the liability limits for bodily injury or death contained within the policy.

·      Subsection (B)’s “up to” language refers to per vehicle coverage, not total UIM coverage in a stacked scenario. Thus, subsection (B) codifies requirements pertaining to the offer and purchase of UIM coverage, it does not concern stacking, and therefore it does not restrict what an insurer may be obligated to pay out on a claim.

Read the entire opinion here:  https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/OpinionFiles/Supreme/2023/CV220266CQ.pdf

Five CDS Lawyers named to the 2024 Edition of The Best Lawyers in America®

Christian Dichter & Sluga, P.C. is proud to announce that five of its lawyers have been recognized in the 2024 Edition of The Best Lawyers in America®. We are particularly excited that our partner JP Harrington Bisceglia has been recognized for the first name this year!

Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers has earned the respect of the profession, the media and the public as the most reliable, unbiased source of legal referrals. For the 2024 edition of The Best Lawyers in America, more than 13+ million votes were analyzed to identify the top legal talent, as identified by their peers.

Lawyers on The Best Lawyers in America list are divided by geographic region and practice areas. They are reviewed by their peers based on professional expertise and undergo an authentication process to make sure they are in current practice and in good standing.

Christian Dichter & Sluga, P.C. would like to congratulate the following lawyers named to 2024 The Best Lawyers in America list:

J.P. Harrington Bisceglia
Newly Recognized in 2024 Edition!

·  Insurance Law

·  Litigation – Insurance

Doug Christian

·  Commercial Litigation

·  Insurance Law

·  Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

Stephen Dichter

·  Commercial Litigation

·  Criminal Defense: White-Collar

·  Litigation – Banking and Finance

·  Litigation – Securities
Jill Ann Herman

·  Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

·  Product Liability Litigation – Defendants

Gena Sluga

·  Insurance Law

·  Litigation – Insurance

·  Appellate Practice

·  Commercial Litigation

Congratulations, Gena and Amanda, on being individually ranked by Chambers in the category of Arizona Insurance Law!

Christian Dichter & Sluga is so proud to announce that our Partner J.P. Harrington Bisceglia was sworn in to the United States Supreme Court Bar on March 21, 2023.

The University of San Diego School of Law Alumni, of which J.P. is President of the Phoenix Board, proudly sponsored its inaugural United States Supreme Court Admission group.  To qualify for Supreme Court admission, applicants must have been admitted to practice in the highest court of a State for a period of at least three years immediately before the date of application; must not have been the subject of any adverse disciplinary action pronounced or in effect during that 3-year period; and must appear to the Court to be of good moral and professional character. Additionally, the applicant needs to be sponsored by two current members of the Supreme Court Bar. J.P. was sponsored by Doug Christian, founding shareholder of CDS, and Don Myles, a partner at Jones Skelton & Hochuli with whom J.P. tried a case several years ago.

J.P. described the experience as a humbling reminder of the importance of serving as an attorney. Part of the opportunity included observing oral arguments before the Court addressing key business law issues that affect CDS client needs. J.P. would like to thank the University of San Diego School of Law Alumni Office, Dean Robert Schapiro, and CDS for making this possible.