Congratulations to Doug Christian, Gena Sluga, JP Harrington Bisceglia and Amanda Taylor for recognition in Insurance Coverage; Stephen Dichter in White Collar Criminal Defense; Jeff Hutchins for recognition in Business Litigation and Justin Vanderveer for recognition as a Rising Star in Insurance Coverage.

The Arizona Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Medina v. Est. of Cody, No. 1 CA-CV 22-0709, 2023 WL 6470727, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2023), in which Gena L. Sluga, managing partner at Christian Dichter and Sluga appeared on behalf of Sentry Insurance Company (“Sentry”). The Court held as follows:

·      The broad authority granted to the Navajo tribe to govern enrolled tribal members under the Treaty of 1869 precluded the underlying state court from hearing this particular action;

·      Federal precedent makes clear that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim against enrolled tribal members in state court for torts arising from conduct that occurs on a defendant’s reservation, even if the action occurs on a state highway.

SUMMARY

The Court of Appeals upheld the Superior Court’s dismissal of a tort claim based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The action arose from a two-car automobile accident that occurred on a state-maintained highway but on tribal land. Plaintiff argued that tribal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over civil tort actions arising from conduct that occurs on state-maintained rights-of-way. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal based on the Treaty of 1869 and decades of legal precedent.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter arose from an automobile accident along a section of U.S. Highway 89 in the Navajo Nation. The occupants of both vehicles were killed upon impact. Mr. Cody, the at-fault driver, was intoxicated and crossed the center line, colliding with the other vehicle, occupied by the Pena Delgado family. Medina, the personal representative for the Pena Delgado family, filed suit against Cody and a separate suit against Cody’s passenger, Aaron Chee, who permitted 18-year-old Cody to drive while intoxicated. The two lawsuits, filed in state court, were eventually consolidated into one action. Sentry successfully moved to intervene in the consolidated action and then moved to dismiss the case arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the tort arose out of on-reservation conduct by members of the Navajo Nation.

The Superior Court agreed and dismissed the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The following facts were undisputed in the dismissal:

(1) The Defendants were Navajo tribal members residing on the Navajo Reservation;

(2) The Pena Delgado family were not tribal members;

(3) The location of the accident was on a state highway within the territory of the Navajo reservation.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal, to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

LEGAL REASONING

The primary question before the court was one of jurisdiction over Native Americans and their land. The Court began by noting that questions of jurisdiction over Native Americans are a patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law compiled throughout history. The exact issue in this case was previously addressed in Enriquez v. Superior Court, 115 Ariz. 342, 342-43 (App. 1977). To resolve the question, the Enriquez court looked at the United States Supreme Court’s decision of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959) which held that state courts may not exercise jurisdiction over on-reservation activity and a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) which defined “Indian Country” to include all lands within the limits of any Indian Reservation, including rights-of-way running through the reservation.

Plaintiff acknowledged that the Enriquez decision has not been overruled in Arizona, but argued instead that subsequent case law raised questions of its continuing viability. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that a series of United States Supreme Court cases should be used to apply stricter limitations on the reach of tribal jurisdiction and urged the Court of Appeals to revisit and reverse Enriquez.

The Court of Appeals found that the Supreme Court, without overruling its prior holding of Williams, has identified a separate framework for resolving conflicts between state and tribal jurisdiction. Williams had created an infringement test considering the scope of state court jurisdiction over an enrolled tribal member. The more recent cases cited by Plaintiffs have explored the extent of tribal court jurisdiction over non-tribal members. The Court determined that Arizona has not assumed general jurisdiction over Native American tribes and their members, thus, its authority to address disputes involving tribal members for on-reservation conduct is limited by jurisdictional framework from the Supreme Court.

In this case, the Court of Appeals held that the pertinent facts fall squarely in the framework of the Williams’ decision. Under Williams, a state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if (1) a non-tribal member brings a claim against an enrolled tribal member for conduct occurring on that member’s reservation, or (2) all parties are enrolled tribal members of the same tribe and the claim involves conduct occurring on the tribes reservation. Under this test, the claims brought by Plaintiff falls under part (1) of the test and thus a state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

However, Plaintiff also argued that a U.S. Highway that runs through tribal land is non-Indian fee land. The Supreme Court has indeed previously concluded that state-maintained highway on which an accident occurred was the equivalent of non-Indian fee land. But, the decision of Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 449 (1997) was intentionally limited to actions against non-tribal members. As such, Strate does not supplant Williams. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Superior Court to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, as the Navajo tribal court’s authority would have been infringed had the state court decided the case on the merits.

Link to the opinion: https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/OpinionFiles/Div1/2023/1%20CA-CV%2022-0709%20-%20Medina%20v.%20Chee%20-%20Opinion.pdf

By: Asha Sebastian, Esq.

On July 28, 2023, the Arizona Supreme Court issued its Opinion in Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., CV-22-0266-CQ, 2023 WL 4833792, holding as follows:

1.    In order to prevent insureds from intra-policy stacking, insurers must comply with the anti-stacking provision of A.R.S. §20-259.01(H) by (a) expressly and plainly limiting stacking in the policy and (b) satisfying the notice requirement by informing the insured of their “right to select one policy or coverage” either in the policy itself or in writing to the insured within thirty days after the insurer is notified of the accident.

2.    A.R.S. §20-259.01(B) does not limit collection under UIM coverage.

SUMMARY

In Franklin, the Arizona Supreme Court answered two certified questions of law, submitted by the District Court of Arizona on the issue of stacking automobile insurance policies. The Court held that A.R.S. §20-259.01 mandates that a single policy insuring multiple vehicles provides separate underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage for each vehicle, and that intra-policy stacking is permitted. The Court also ruled that an insured may stack UIM coverages to recover an amount higher than her policy’s liability limits, regardless of the language in A.R.S. §20-259.01(B) governing what UIM limits insurers are required to offer.

FACTS

The Insured died in an automobile accident caused by a negligent driver. The Insured’s daughter, Ms. Franklin, collected the per-person liability of the negligent driver’s insurance policy and then submitted a UIM claim to her mother’s insurer, CSAA General Insurance Company.  At the time of the accident, the Insured’s Policy covered her two vehicles and provided $50,000 of UIM coverage “per person.” The policy also included a limitation of liability clause, limiting the amount paid to the Limit of Liability shown on the Dec Page, regardless of covered cars and premiums paid. 

In spite of receiving $50,000 under the Insured’s UIM coverage, Franklin sought to obtain an additional $50,000 under an “intra-policy stacking” theory, arguing that because the policy covered two vehicles, it provided a second separate UIM coverage which increased the Insured’s total UIM coverage from $50,000 to $100,000.  Franklin argued that because CSAA failed to comply with the notice requirements of A.R.S. §20-259.01(H), the policy’s UIM limits could be stacked.

When CSAA rejected Franklin’s claim for the additional $50,000, she sued CSAA in federal district court for declaratory judgment, alleging breach of contract and bad faith.  In the course of the litigation, CSAA filed a motion for the district court to certify two questions of law to the Arizona Supreme Court. The AZ Supreme Court accepted review to clarify how A.R.S. §20-259.01 regulates an insurer’s ability to preclude insureds from intra-policy stacking UIM coverages.

LEGAL REASONING

On the first question of whether A.R.S. §20-259.01 classifies multi-vehicle insurance policies as providing a single UIM coverage or multiple UIM coverages for each vehicle, the Court found that while the text of the statute was ambiguous, the statute’s history and purpose clearly indicated that multi-vehicle policies provide separate UIM coverages for each vehicle.  In coming to this conclusion, the Court reasoned as follows:

·      Subsection (H) of Arizona’s anti-stacking statute dictates how insurers can prevent insureds from stacking UIM or UM coverages. To limit stacking under subsection (H), insurers must (1) expressly and plainly limit stacking in the policy and (2) satisfy the notice requirement informing the insured of their “right to select one policy or coverage” either in the policy itself or in writing to the insured within thirty days after the insurer is notified of the accident.

·      The text of subsection (H) that relates to “coverages purchased” is ambiguous, as it is unclear whether a multi-vehicle policy constitutes purchasing of multiple UIM coverages for each vehicle. In reviewing the statutory history, the Court ruled that A.R.S. §20-259.01’s text and statutory history supports a broader interpretation of “coverages purchased.”  As a result, all multi-vehicle policies provide separate UIM coverage per vehicle that insured has “purchased,” triggering the application of subsection (H) to multi-vehicle policies.

·      The purpose of subsection (H), as amended in 1997, was to provide the sole means by which insurers may limit UIM/UM stacking – whether intra-policy (in a multi-vehicle policy) or inter-policy (when separate policies insure separate vehicles).

On the second question of whether A.R.S. §20-259.01(B) imposes a ceiling on UIM coverage based on the bodily injury or death liability limits of the policy, the Court held that subsection (B) does not restrict what an insurer may be obligated to pay out pursuant to a claim.  In coming to this conclusion, the Court reasoned as follows:

·      Subsection (B) requires insurers to initially offer insureds UIM coverage with “limits not less than the liability limits for bodily injury or death.” The legislature’s use of the phrase “not less than” means the insurer must, at a minimum, offer UIM coverage that is at least the same amount of the policy’s bodily injury or death liability limits.

·      Subsection (B) also allows insureds to request and purchase UIM coverage in any amount that the insureds select. Thus, an insured may reject the insurer’s initial offer and request UIM coverage in any amount up to the liability limits for bodily injury or death contained within the policy.

·      Subsection (B)’s “up to” language refers to per vehicle coverage, not total UIM coverage in a stacked scenario. Thus, subsection (B) codifies requirements pertaining to the offer and purchase of UIM coverage, it does not concern stacking, and therefore it does not restrict what an insurer may be obligated to pay out on a claim.

Read the entire opinion here:  https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/OpinionFiles/Supreme/2023/CV220266CQ.pdf

Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The selection process includes independent research, peer nominations, and peer evaluations. Every year, Super Lawyers evaluates lawyers across the country for its annual list of top attorneys. Each candidate is measured against 12 indicators of peer recognition and professional achievement. Nominees from more than 70 practice areas are considered. The patented multiphase selection process is rigorous and methodical. The Top Lists below take exclusivity one step further by featuring selected Super Lawyers attorneys with the most total points earned.

Christian Dichter & Sluga, P.C. has been ranked in the 2023 U.S. News – Best Lawyers^® “Best Law Firms” list nationally in 1 practice areas and regionally in 7 practice areas.

Firms included in the 2023 U.S. News – Best Lawyers^® “Best Law Firms” list are recognized for professional excellence with persistently impressive ratings from clients and peers. Achieving a tiered ranking signals a unique combination of quality law practice and breadth of legal expertise.

The 2023 edition of U.S. News – Best Lawyers^® “Best Law Firms”; includes rankings in 75 national practice areas and 127 metropolitan – based practice areas. Additionally, one “Law Firm of the Year” was named in each nationally-ranked practice area.

Ranked firms, presented in tiers, are listed on a national and/or metropolitan scale. Receiving a tier designation reflects the high level of respect a firm has earned among other leading lawyers and clients in the same communities and the same practice areas for their abilities, their professionalism and their integrity.

Christian Dichter & Sluga, P.C. received the following rankings in the 2023 U.S. News – Best Lawyers^® “Best Law Firms”:

• National Tier 3
• Litigation – Banking & Finance
• Regional Tier 1
• Phoenix
• Commercial Litigation
• Criminal Defense: White-Collar
• Insurance Law
• Litigation – Banking & Finance
• Litigation – Insurance
• Regional Tier 2
• Phoenix
• Litigation – Securities
• Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

ABOUT “BEST LAW FIRMS”

The U.S. News – Best Lawyers^® “Best Law Firms” rankings are based on a rigorous evaluation process that includes the collection of client and lawyer evaluations, peer review from leading attorneys in the field, and review of additional information provided by law firms as part of the formal submission process. To be eligible for a 2023 ranking, a law firm must have at least one lawyer recognized in the 13th edition of The Best Lawyers in America^® list for that particular location and specialty.

ABOUT U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

U.S. News & World Report is the global leader in quality rankings that empower people to make better, more informed decisions about important issues affecting their lives. A digital news and information company focused on Education, Health, Money, Travel, Cars and News, USNews.com provides consumer advice, rankings and analysis to serve people making complex decisions throughout all stages of life. More than 40 million people visit USNews.com each month for research and guidance. Founded in 1933, U.S. News is headquartered in Washington, D.C.

ABOUT BEST LAWYERS

Best Lawyers is the oldest and most respected lawyer ranking service in the world. For 40 years, Best Lawyers has assisted those in need of legal services to identify the lawyers best qualified to represent them in distant jurisdictions or unfamiliar specialties. Best Lawyers awards are published in leading local, regional and national publications across the globe.

Lawyers who are nominated for consideration are voted on by currently recognized Best Lawyers working in the same practice area and located in the same geographic region. Our awards and recognitions are based purely on the feedback we receive from these top lawyers. Those who receive high peer reviews undergo a thorough verification process to make sure they are currently still in private practice. Only then can these top lawyers be recognized by Best Lawyers.

Amanda will continue to work with our clients and associates on matters involving insurance coverage and claim management. Says CDS Partner, Doug Christian: “Amanda brings several valuable skills to our partnership. Like others she is joining in our partnership, she is a bright, experienced insurance lawyer. She also, just as a person, is someone you can trust. We see it every day and her clients see it in her steady work and practical advice. It is good to have her now at the partnership table.”

Amanda takes great pride in cultivating relationships with not only her clients, but also with experts, co-counsel, and others in the legal field. As a result, she is highly regarded within the legal community. Amanda is honored to be recognized by Southwest Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in the field of insurance coverage since 2014.

Amanda works tirelessly to protect and advocate for her clients. Each trial that she has co-chaired has resulted in favorable verdicts for her clients. One such example was an insurance bad faith trial that resulted in a defense verdict as well as an award of attorneys’ fees and costs for her client.

CDS is one of the five law firms in Arizona to be ranked as a Band 1 law firm in Insurance law. Ms. Sluga is one of two women to receive the distinct honor of a Band 1 ranking for lawyers in the Insurance practice group in Arizona.

Ms. Sluga is honored by this recognition and the kind words shared by clients during the research process:

“Gena is our go-to for complex coverage litigation.” 

“She utilizes a strategic approach, always watching out for bigger picture implications.” 

“Gena is awesome, very knowledgeable and a fighter.”

Chambers and Partners is an independent research company that operates across 200 jurisdictions. The London-based publishers conduct comprehensive annual research, including in-depth interviews with thousands of lawyers and clients, as they seek to assess the reputations and expertise of lawyers from across the country. A team of more than 200 full-time editors and researchers performs independent research and conducts in-depth interviews with clients and lawyers to develop each annual directory. Christian, Dichter & Sluga’s rankings are assessed on qualities including technical legal ability, professional conduct, client service, commercial vision, and business understanding, diligence, commitment, and other qualities most valued by the client.

CDS Law was ranked in the following practice areas:

Phoenix – Metropolitan Tier One

Insurance Law

Litigation – Insurance

Commercial Litigation

Criminal Defense: White – Collar

Phoenix Metropolitan Tier Two

Litigation – Banking and Finance (National Tier Three)

Litigation – Securities

Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

The AADC is a non-profit organization established in April 1965 and is comprised of defense attorneys from all backgrounds who practice primarily in civil defense litigation. The AADC is dedicated to the education, fellowship, and enrichment of its members and the judiciary and increasing community awareness of positive aspects of the legal profession. The AADC strives to build an inclusive culture that thrives on diverse beliefs, perspectives, and experiences, and improve and foster the development of minority and underrepresented groups within the legal profession.

Ms. Harrington Bisceglia spent her first year on the AADC Diversity Task Force building connections between AADC and the Collaborative Bar to increase meaningful relationships between AADC members and diverse non-members. By creating an avenue for diverse attorneys to be exposed to the content the AADC shares throughout the year, the Diversity Task Force provided the initial foundation to a more collaborative and inclusive experience. Ms. Harrington Bisceglia will continue building these connections as the bar organizations move from virtual interactions to in-person meetings.

Congratulations to J.P. Harrington Bisceglia on this wonderful achievement!

Summary. Christian, Kravitz, Dichter, Johnson & Sluga (“CKDJS”) recently secured a victory for their insurer clients before the Supreme Court of Nevada in an appeal regarding the validity of an exclusion for damages “payable to insured” in a personal umbrella liability policy. The Court affirmed the Eighth Judicial District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurers, concluding that NRS 687B.147—a statute governing disclosure of certain exclusions in connection with a “policy of motor vehicle insurance”—does not apply to umbrella policies. The Court also announced that an insured contesting application of an exclusion on the basis of nondisclosure must offer admissible evidence in support of that assertion (such as an affidavit). The District Court properly found that the exclusion was valid and precluded coverage for the insured’s claim for benefits under the umbrella policy’s liability insurance.

Background Facts. Appellant Filippo Sciarratta was injured in a single vehicle accident while riding as a passenger on his Kawasaki motorcycle; he alleged that his injuries were caused by the negligence of his friend, who was driving the motorcycle at the time. After recovering for his injuries under the driver’s own auto policy and the insured’s motorcycle policy (under which his friend was covered as a permissive user of the bike), the insured demanded an additional $1,000,000 in benefits under a personal umbrella liability policy. The umbrella carrier denied coverage, citing the policy’s “payable to an insured” exclusion, and litigation ensued. The insurer defendants retained CKDJS to defend and file a counterclaim for declaratory relief. (CKDJS is the joint venture law firm through which Christian Dichter & Sluga practices in Nevada) Nine months later, the insurer moved for summary judgment on all claims. Sciarratta opposed the motion, requesting additional time for discovery and arguing that the exclusion was unenforceable (in part) for the following reasons: 1) the exclusion did not comply with the disclosure requirements of NRS 687B.147 applicable to “a policy of motor vehicle insurance covering a passenger car”; and 2) he claimed that the insurer never sent him (or his wife) a copy of the policy containing the exclusion.

The district court found that NRS 687B.147 is inapplicable to umbrella policies, and that Sciarratta was an “insured” excluded from coverage under the liability policy at issue. The decision was certified as final pursuant to NRCP 54(b), and Sciarratta appealed to the Supreme Court. CKDJS attorneys Cara Christian and Gena Sluga briefed the issue to the court, and Ms. Sluga represented the client at the remote oral argument.

Nevada Supreme Court’s Opinion. In an opinion authored by Justice Stiglich, the Court unambiguously held that “a personal umbrella liability policy is not a ‘policy of motor vehicle insurance’” to which NRS 687B.147 applies. It did so distinguishing case law and legislative history concerning NRS 687B.145 from that relevant to the application of 687B.147—stating: “whereas NRS 687B.145 applies to ‘a policy of insurance covering the use of a passenger car’ . . . NRS 687B.147 applies only to ‘a policy of motor vehicle insurance covering a private passenger car.’” “NRS 687B.145 is predicated on the type of coverage, but NRS 687B.147 is predicated on the type of policy. We conclude that the words ‘motor vehicle’ distinguish NRS 687B.147 from NRS 687B.145 by limiting the application of NRS 687B.147 to primary motor vehicle policies.”

With respect to Sciarratta’s contention in opposition to summary judgment that no insured received written notice of the exclusion, the Court declined to adopt a rule governing the consequences for non-disclosure of an exclusion (as those circumstances were not properly before the trial court). Sciarratta’s affidavit of counsel was insufficient to meet his burden of production under NRCP 56(c)(1)(A), and the district court properly granted summary judgment. The Court was similarly unpersuaded by Sciarratta’s contention that the district court should have granted a request for more time to conduct additional discovery prior to granting summary judgment, citing the permissive language of NRCP 56(d) and stating“[t]he decision to grant or deny a continuance of a motion for summary judgment to allow further discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” The nonmovant must demonstrate that the requested discovery “enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” The affidavit of counsel declaring an intention to depose several individual (only one of which “arguably relevant to Sciarratta’s theory that the policy was not delivered”) did not clearly articulate how discovery would alter the district court’s determination, and the district court was within its discretion to deny a continuance.

The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order granting the insurers’ motion for summary judgment.